The Indiana Pacers are in the middle of not a rebuild, but a rebirth. What’s a rebirth?
The offseason has begun to slow, rosters have begun to fill and the rebirth for the Pacers is taking shape.
It’s not a “salt the earth” Philadelphia 76ers teardown, nor is it a Cleveland Cavaliers “let’s just sign a bunch of older fellas” approach. It’s also not a New York Knicks “we have no idea what we’re doing” menagerie. No, no this is different.
Team building processes all have the same goal: to be like a phoenix, that mythical majestic bird who would end its life being consumed by fire, only to reemerge like Daenerys Targaryen from the flames better than ever, and not like the actual Phoenix basketball team that died in the flames around 2010 and has yet to emerge unsinged, charred or otherwise.
The Pacers want to stride out of the Paul George-inspired inferno quickly, while also losing the fewest games possible. This isn’t a new concept in NBA history. The last four dynasties (90’s Bulls, early ’00s Lakers, mid ’00s Spurs and, as everyone expects, these Warriors) all developed without intentionally tanking for five years in order to gain high draft picks.
Let’s examine each in turn.
Golden State Warriors
There is a difference between intentionally tanking for a rebuild and just being terrible. After Golden State traded Chris Webber, the Warriors spent the next 15 years being mostly awful. The difference is not just the duration but also the intention. Once you repeatedly change direction and core pieces of your rebuild, you cease rebuilding and now stink, needing to build anew.
Golden State won 38 percent of their games and went to the playoffs once during their 15-year sojourn.
What’s weird about how these Warriors were constructed was they never hit rock bottom, they were just mediocre. From 2003 on, their earliest pick was sixth (Ekpe Udoh) in 2011. None of their major pieces were top picks: Stephen Curry (seventh, 2010), Klay Thompson (11th, 2012), Draymond Green (35th, 2013) and then Harrison Barnes (seventh, 2013) wasn’t re-signed to make room for free agent Kevin Durant.
They were built through being mediocre and hitting on less than savory draft picks.
2003-07 Spurs
I’ve already told the story of how the Spurs tanked to get Tim Duncan. The Spurs were no rebuilding team. They won 67 percent of their games from 1990-1996 and 70 percent from 1997-2002. And, contrary to popular belief, San Antonio wasn’t an expert drafting team either (legends Dwayne Schintzius, Tracy Murray, Bill Curley, Cory Alexander, Felipe Lopez and Leon Smith were most of their first-rounders during that stretch).
But the Spurs dynasty wasn’t built through a rebuild, they were built through finding diamonds in the rough, with the lone exception being Duncan.
Besides Duncan, there were three Spurs on each of the 2000’s championships: Tony Parker (28th, 2001), Manu Ginobili (57th, 1999), and Bruce Bowen (signed as a free agent after playing for four different teams).
There were three other players that won two rings with the Spurs during that stretch: Beno Udrih was drafted (28th, 2004), while Brent Barry and Robert Horry were both free agents signed in their mid-thirties.
Los Angeles Lakers
Another team that didn’t bottom out is the Los Angeles Lakers. In the five years between Magic Johnson‘s first retirement and the acquisitions of Kobe Bryant and Shaquille O’Neal, the Lakers stayed mostly competitive. They went to the playoffs in four of those five seasons, making the Western Conference Semi-Finals in ’95, and never picked higher than 10th (a selection which turned into All-Star Eddie Jones) in 1994.
The Lakers have a better track record of attracting free agents than the Pacers do, and that certainly influenced the way they approached their team building. Still, their process is instructive.
90’s Bulls
The Chicago Bulls pre-Michael Jordan hadn’t been good since 1975. Between ’76 and ’84, Chicago went to the playoffs once and lost 59 percent of their games. Then they drafted Michael Jordan… and had three straight losing seasons.
It wasn’t for a lack of trying, they made the playoffs in each of those seasons (Michael’s Bulls never missed the playoffs), while quickly exiting in the first round each time.
The Bulls built their first three-peat through the draft, but not by bottoming out. Horace Grant was picked 10th in 1987, Scottie Pippen was traded for that same season by swapping picks with Seattle, BJ Armstrong came 18th overall in 1989 and they even grabbed Toni Kukoc 29th in 1990.
Steps of a Rebirth
There’s no one way to build a champion. None of the most successful teams in the last 27 years got that way by doing what Philadelphia or this current dumpster-fire pretending to be the Lakers are doing. It’s actually more similar what the Pacers are trying. I looked at this “rebirth” and came up with four key steps. Below are those steps and how the Pacers have tried to fulfill them.
Step 1: Get younger
The Pacers weren’t exactly old last year, but they weren’t getting younger either. A healthy portion of their roster was either in their primes or past it. This meant that there would be likely little room for internal improvement. A player in his late 20’s just isn’t as likely to make as much significant growth as a player in his early 20’s.
This offseason, Indy made large strides to get younger, the average age of their first eight new players (I’m excluding Damien Wilkins) was 23.5.
And in reality that number is inflated by Darren Collison, Bojan Bogdanovic and Cory Joseph. Collison and Bogdanovic might not even be in the Pacers’ future plans. If you average out the ages of the other five incomers, who are definitely affixed in the Pacers’ dreams, (Ike Anigbogu, T.J. Leaf, Victor Oladipo, Domantas Sabonis and Edmond Sumner), the average age drops to 21.8.
The trek to the fountain of youth has been successful, at least on paper.
Step 2: Don’t absorb needlessly bad contracts
Spending $21 million a year on a starter that you think could blossom into an All-Star (Oladipo) is one thing, spending $21M on the fifth big man, in an effort to absorb a team’s bad contract, is another. It’s the surest way to ensure that your team is in the toilet for a decade.
Evidence? The archetype was the 2007 trade that sent Kevin Garnett to Boston. In return, Minnesota received: two first-round picks (wasted on Wayne Ellington and Jonny Flynn), Ryan Gomes, Gerald Green, Al Jefferson, Theo Ratliff and Sebastian Telfair. The Wolves have not yet had even a winning record. It’s been a decade.
It’s imperative for a team in Indiana’s predicament to preserve future cap space, and it’s impossible to do so when some other team’s dead weight in pulling you down. Look at Portland.
With three young stars (Damian Lillard, C.J. McCollum and Jusuf Nurkic), along with two good draft picks (forwards Zach Collins and Caleb Swanigan) Portland should be a contender in the West and be in a position to add a key free agent, rumors of interest in Carmelo Anthony notwithstanding.
But they can’t because they have $127.6M committed to Allen Crabbe, Evan Turner, Meyers Leonard, Maurice Harkless and Al-Farouq Aminu for the next two seasons.
The Pacers do not have that problem. Indy not only has cap room going forward to add a future key free agent.
Step 3. Improve obvious deficiencies
After finishing first, first, seventh and third in defensive rating from 2013 to 2016, Indy fell to 18th last year. It became more explicit in the postseason when the tandem of Monta Ellis and Jeff Teague were shredded by the Cavaliers backcourt. Both players saw their defensive rating plummet with Ellis’ falling 11 points, and Teague’s 10.
Enter Oladipo and Joseph. While the defensive stats the NBA has are far from perfect, they speak very highly of Oladipo. Among guards (minimum of 60 games played) he’s in the top 10 in defensive rating (102.1) and top five in defensive win shares (.051). Stephenson’s has always been a good defender, and Joseph brings a reputation of playing hard on defense.
With the perimeter improved, Indy turned toward the interior where a lack of size rendered the frontcourt porous. A surprising source of improvement will come from Sabonis. While Myles Turner’s defense is clearly impressive, Sabonis uses his agility to get the job done as well, albeit in a less dramatic way. Last year his defensive rating was 3.2 points better than Turner’s, while his defensive win shares was just six points behind Turner’s.
Speaking of Turner, if there are questions of a leadership void, the big 21-year-old appears to be stepping into it. He was everywhere this offseason. Guess who was at the draft to welcome Leaf and Anigbogu? Turner. Guess who was sitting on the bench in Orlando cheering on the Pacers during the Summer League? Turner. He’ll have to prove it on the court, but these are good signs nevertheless.
Step 4. Stay competitive
This has been a sticking point for some Pacer fans, which is odd to me. Since 1990, Indiana has been to the playoffs 22 times, tied for second most in the NBA. Also during that time, Indiana has been a top four seed 10 times, eighth most. Sustaining that successful foundation should matter.
Sure some would argue that getting bounced from the first round isn’t the sign of a champion. But, Michael Jordan’s Bulls would disagree. As would Reggie Miller’s Pacers.
Those Pacers went to six Eastern Conference Finals between 1994 and 2004. The foundation for those runs was laid in the early 90’s when Indy snuck into the playoffs and got their butts kicked by Detroit (1990) and Boston (1992). Indy terrified the Celtics in 1991, then sent up a warning flare against New York in 1993.
Four first round exits. Four first round exits that provided invaluable experience for a young Pacers team that would go on to be the East’s number one contender for the better part of the next decade.
I suppose the other reason for objection is that being competitive means Indy won’t have any high lottery picks. That’s true.
But. I’ll offer you two points to consider.
1. Since 1987, Indiana has drafted seven all-stars: Reggie Miller (11th, 1987), Rik Smits (2nd, 1988), Antonio Davis (45th, 1990), Dale Davis (13th, 1991), Danny Granger (17th, 2005), Roy Hibbert (17th, 2008) and Paul George (10th, 2010). Only one came from inside the top ten.
But that’s a little misleading – even though the man who picked the first four, Donnie Walsh, is still with the team as an advisor- the draft was different in the late ’80s and early ’90s. Most of the players then were juniors or seniors. Each team received a more finished product than they do today, because…
2. The draft is more volatile since the one-and-done era began in 2007. Since 2007, five All-Stars have come from the first pick. Since 2007, five All-Stars have also come from the ninth pick. Since 2007 the same amount of All-Stars have been picked fifth as have been picked 35th (two). Since 2007, you have as good a chance selecting an All-Star picking between ninth and 11th (eight total) as you do picking in the top three (eight total). And you have a better chance at finding one picking between 15th and 19th (five) than you do fourth through eighth (four).
Next: Love/Hate Series: T.J. Leaf
This is what a rebirth looks like. Play hard, gain playoff experience and draft well. It has been done before, it can be done again.